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A Neo-Institutional Explanation of State Supreme Court
Responses in Search and Seizure Cases
The relationship between the Supreme Court and lower courts is more complicated than it
may appear at first glance. In order to better understand this relationship, we examine
how Supreme Court precedent affects state supreme court decision-making. Toward this
end, we investigate whether and how Supreme Court precedent impacts lower court
decisions. Examining state supreme court decisions in the area of search and seizure, we
specifically test hypotheses about how state judicial context and Supreme Court behavior
influences when the lower court is likely to be affected by Supreme Court precedent. We
address the nature of state supreme court responses to Supreme Court precedent in search
and seizure cases decided between 1983 and 1993. We find that there is substantial
variation in the responses to precedent by state supreme courts. Specifically, we find that
precedent does have a substantial influence on the behavior of state supreme court
justices, but judicial ideology and the level of historical conflict between the Supreme
Court and the state supreme court are also important in understanding the dissemination
of precedent to the states. Most interestingly, the effect of judicial retention methods on
the application of precedent are considerable.

Introduction
There exists a diverse body of research on how lower courts are impacted by
Supreme Court precedent (Beiser 1968; Benesh and Reddick 2002; Gruhl 1980; Johnson
1979; Klein and Hume 2003; Emmert and Traut 1994; Hoekstra 2005; Romans 1974).
To the extent that state supreme courts have been the subject of such work, the findings
suggest that they are attentive to precedent but vary notably in their application of the
Court’s decisions. At times, Supreme Court precedent appears to have a tangible
influence on the outcomes of the decisions of state supreme court justices, while in other
contexts the ideology of the justices or state level political factors serve to mitigate the
power of precedent.
The relationship between the Supreme Court and lower courts is therefore more
complicated than it may appear at first glance. In order to better understand this
relationship, we examine the impact of Supreme Court precedent on state supreme court
decision-making. Examining state supreme court decisions in the area of search and
seizure, we assess how state judicial context and Supreme Court precedent influences
how state courts respond to the precedent they cite. Our findings suggest that the judicial
retention system and the degree of Supreme Court monitoring of the state supreme court
are of primary importance in understanding the responses of state supreme court justices
to Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, justices in merit retention states are more
attentive to precedent of the Supreme Court than justices in either elite or competitive
election systems.
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The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Lower Courts
Judicial decision-makers are influenced by a complex array of factors, including their
own preferences (Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000; Segal and Spaeth 2002) and the political
environment (Epstein and Knight 2000; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000). But
the decisions of other courts, especially higher courts, are also important. Partly this is
because precedent is a guide for how to make decisions in the presence of specific fact
patterns (Emmert 1992; Emmert and Traut 1994; George and Epstein 1992; Segal 1984,
1986; Segal and Spaeth 2002). It is also because precedent is a normative guide for
lower courts, especially in cases with novel fact pact patterns (Knight and Epstein 1996;
Landes and Posner 1976; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Wahlbeck 1997).
Nevertheless, there is considerable debate about the ability of higher courts to get
lower courts to adhere to their decisions. Much of the work on the role of precedent
focuses on the hierarchical nature of the federal court system, analyzing how the lower
court’s political preferences interact with the Supreme Court’s limited ability to monitor
them to produce variations in lower court behavior (Benesh and Reddick 2001; Dickson
1994; Gruhl 1980, 1981; Johnson 1979; Romans 1974; Tarr 1977; Wasby 1970). Recent
research on the federal circuit courts indicates that the Supreme Court’s limited ability to
hear cases affects both which courts they tend to review (Cameron, Segal, and Songer
2000) and the extent to which lower court justices “shirk” in order to pursue their own
policy interests (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; but see also Cross 2005).
To what extent do these conclusions apply to state supreme courts? Does Supreme
Court precedent effect the decisions of state justices? Or, are their own political
preferences more important, behaving as if they are not subject to the Supreme Court’s
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authority? Do state judicial institutions affect their susceptibility to monitoring by the
Supreme Court? The answers to these questions are not clear, primarily because the
relationship between state courts and the Supreme Court is not strictly hierarchical. That
is, not all decisions handed down by the state supreme courts are liable to Supreme Court
review. This means that, in addition to factors that may allow all lower courts to avoid
implementing decisions of the Supreme Court, state supreme courts can also rely on their
own state constitutions and laws to determine the outcome of a case when issues of
federal law are not implicated. Such reasoning indicates that the United State Supreme
Court should have no more than a limited effect on the behavior of these courts.
But this is not necessarily the case. First, Supreme Court precedent might be a useful
strategic tool for state judicial actors who are seeking to justify unpopular decisions for
state voters and elites. Since a large majority of state supreme court justices are not
lifetime appointees and are therefore subordinates in local state political hierarchies, their
specialized knowledge of Supreme Court precedent may allow them to “shirk” locally.
Second, state supreme courts are not entirely independent of the Supreme Court because
many matters that come before them potentially implicate federal law. Accordingly, they
still have some relationship with the Supreme Court and its decisions. Third, the
Supreme Court itself has an interest in maintaining its own authority to review state
decisions and using that to affect policy change on a broader scale. For instance, Justice
O’Connor, writing for the majority in Michigan v. Long, argued that the Court would
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assume that decisions of state supreme courts implicated federal law unless explicitly
stated otherwise in the opinion.1
Empirical research does not resolve these conflicting expectations. Although state
supreme courts enjoy certain latitude, their decisions are still shaped by Supreme Court
precedent (see Cannon 1973, 1974). For example, Hoekstra’s (2005) study of minimum
wage law from the early part of the 20th century shows that Supreme Court decisions
substantially influence the probability state courts overturn challenges to state laws.
Conversely, other work on state supreme courts suggests that institutional arrangements,
case facts, and judicial preferences are also influential. Brace and Hall have
demonstrated that state level institutions affect the decisions of state supreme courts
(Brace and Hall 1990, 1993, 1997; Hall and Brace 1989, 1992, 1994). Clearly state
supreme court justices work in an environment with a wide array of legal and institutional
pressures (see Langer 2002). We expect that these forces – both legal and electoral – will
affect the choices made by state supreme court justices in search and seizure cases. Our
goal here is to expand on these themes by systematically exploring how these state
conditions predicate the influence of Supreme Court precedent.
Theoretical Framework
The use of Supreme Court precedent by state supreme courts is complicated by the
difficulty state judges have in reconciling state and federal law. Previous studies of
Supreme Court/Circuit Court of Appeals interactions relies in large part on principalagent theory to explain the dissemination of Supreme Court precedent among those
courts (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000;
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Westerland, Segal, Epstein, Comparato, and Cameron 2006). Yet this may not be the
most appropriate lens through which to monitor the relationship between the Supreme
Court and state supreme courts. Though the Supreme Court has substantial power to
review state courts, the relationship is not strictly hierarchical for reasons discussed
above. Unlike judges on lower federal courts, state supreme courts are also embedded in
state political environments that include other actors with the ability to influence their
decisions. Governors, state legislatures, and the public have means at their disposal to
alter policy in response to the written decisions of state supreme courts, the most
important of which is the ability to remove judicial decision-makers from office. It is
those arrangements that constrain the decision making process of state supreme court
justices further complicating their relationship with the Supreme Court.
Because state supreme court justices are motivated to retain their position, they
behave in a manner to minimize the risk of removal. As a result, they must concern
themselves not only with the probability that their decisions may be reviewed and
overturned by the Supreme Court, but must also be mindful of the local political context.
This is not to suggest that state supreme court justices are simply instruments of state
level actors with the power to retain those judges, but it does have profound implications
for understanding how state supreme courts make us of Supreme Court precedent. We
wholly expect that other factors, such as their own policy goals, will affect their
decisions. However, because most state justices do not enjoy life tenure we expect the
structure of their seat retention incentives to also be influential.
This orientation focuses our attention on the institutional arrangements that determine
how state justices maintain their position. While we consider it axiomatic that they wish
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to avoid reversal by the Supreme Court, local political pressures may create situations in
which following such precedent might put them in jeopardy of staying on their court.
Specifically, the fact that the states use different methods for retaining state supreme
court justices leads us to expect that the constraints imposed by these institutional
differences will generate different responses to Supreme Court precedent. They will
behave in a risk averse manner, minimizing the negative electoral consequences of their
decisions while in the pursuit of their most preferred policy outcome.
Related to this issue of risk avoidance is the question of monitoring. Most decisions
of state supreme court justices are unknown to the electorate. For state supreme court
justices the more relevant, and potentially harmful, monitoring comes from the state
political elites. These actors (governor or legislature) are more likely to be aware of the
decisions of the state supreme court, and whether their decisions have been reviewed and
overturned by the Supreme Court. Because political elites are more likely to be
interested in, and informed about, the actions of the state supreme court we expect them
to exercise closer scrutiny of justices than will state electorates. Within systems that elect
judges, we further expect those in competitive systems to more closely monitored than
those in retention systems.
These local monitoring differences hold different implications for state judges. First,
in elite retention systems the main impact of the Supreme Court ought to be through fact
patterns and not policy. This is because elites have more clear power over state supreme
court justices, as well as better knowledge of their decisions. Second, in electoral
systems, monitoring by the electorate should be low enough that judges have
considerable latitude in how to make decisions (see Baum 1983, 1987; Dubois 1979;
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Sheldon and Lovrich 1983). More importantly, the low level of monitoring implies that
they should be relatively safe and secure as long as they do not engage in behavior that
alerts the public.2 We conjecture that a prominent way for this to occur is by engaging in
protracted contract with the Supreme Court because that is likely to draw the attention of
the media and opinion leaders.
Finally, the presence of potential competitors in some electoral systems ought to also
produce some variations in judicial behavior. Even as we expect judges in those systems
to be risk averse and generally wanting to avoid conflict with the Supreme Court, the
possibility of facing competition – even if rare – means that they must be in a position to
defend their decisions to an electorate concerned with more than just judicial merit.
Since the Supreme Court traditionally has more power to set a floor, rather than a ceiling,
in civil liberties cases, that provides these justices with political cover when citing liberal
precedent. Consequently, we expect conflict with the Supreme Court to produce
responsiveness to liberal precedent, but not to conservative precedent. In merit systems,
the absence of competitors to point out the policy impact of judicial decisions implies an
opposite effect – all that matters is to avoid calling attention to oneself. As such, conflict
with the Supreme Court ought to produce responsiveness to both liberal and conservative
precedent.
Although the state supreme court justices’ motivations, and the Supreme Court’s
limited control over state courts, should limit the impact of Supreme Court precedent on
state decisions, we argue that monitoring by the Supreme Court still matters. What
differs from the Court’s monitoring of federal courts is that its impact depends upon the
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political position of the state court. When ignoring the Supreme Court benefits the lower
court’s ability to signal their quality to the appropriate decision makers at the state level,
we wholly expect them to ignore precedent. However, there may be situations where
conflict with the Court draws unwanted attention and increases the risk of retention for
state justices, thus creating a situation where they may be more willing to follow
precedent. The question, of course, is when monitoring by the Supreme Court interacts
with local monitoring to create a situation in which they follow precedent.
Data and Variables
Sample. In order to test these hypotheses, we analyze a sample of state supreme court
cases that cite orally argued search and seizure cases decided by the Supreme Court
between the 1983 and 1993 terms. We choose to analyze search and seizure cases
because 1.) the likelihood of progeny existing in every state is high, and 2.) it has
remained a relatively constant part of the Supreme Court’s docket. Additionally, using
search and seizure cases allows us to test for judicial impact in a traditional area of state
responsibility (Baum 1978).
We first identified all orally argued search and seizure cases decided by the Supreme
Court between the 1983 and 1993 terms – a total of 63 cases.3 For each of these Supreme
Court cases, we used Shepard’s Citations to compile a list of every decision in a state
court of last resort in which it was cited for the years 1983-1995. This creates a
population of progeny from which we randomly selected 974 cases – approximately
thirty-one percent of all state supreme court cases citing these Supreme Court decisions –
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on which to gather further data. These progeny serve as our primary unit of analysis.4
Using this approach provides a large number of relevant state supreme court cases and
identifies those cases of most interest to our research questions – those that cite Supreme
Court precedent.
Although expedient, this methodology has recognizable limits. First, this sampling
approach potentially overstates the impact of Supreme Court precedent by not including
cases which fail to cite precedent. The primary means of addressing this is by limiting
our conclusions to the appropriate progeny, keeping in mind that a broader statement of
the Court’s impact on the states requires us to model the selection process. Second, state
supreme courts cite Supreme Court precedent that they do not directly deal with in their
own decision. For example, if a lower court disagrees with a specific decision of the
Supreme Court, they may bury the reference to that offending precedent amongst a
number of other cases cited in an attempt to evade the holding of that case. In other
words, they may not be addressing cited precedent in any depth.
To address this second issue, we coded for the total number of citations in the
progeny and the length of the citation string where the generating Supreme Court case
was found.5 Over 70% of the progeny contain only one citation to a Supreme Court
decision, and only two cases are cited in nearly 90% of the progeny. Our data also
suggest that state courts do not “bury” references in a string of cases. In approximately
65% of the progeny, the Supreme Court precedent is cited alone, and it is joined by a
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Texas and Oklahoma have two courts that serve as the court of last resort, one for civil procedures and
one for criminal matters. Since we were dealing with search and seizure cases, we only examined progeny
in the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
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second case in only 21% of the progeny. We take this as evidence that the Supreme
Court precedents we use to generate our sample are central to the case under
consideration by the progeny. We believe this to be fairly compelling evidence that state
supreme court justices recognize the relevance of the Supreme Court precedent, rely on it
in their opinions, and appear to make little effort to obfuscate the fact that it is pertinent
to the case at hand. This makes us feel more confident that our data gathering approach
yields a set of cases and measures that are germane to the issue of state supreme court
compliance.
Variables. Following other work in the field, our dependent variable is a
dichotomous measure of whether the state court ruled in favor of the government (coded
“1”) or the individual (coded “0”). Our hypotheses point to three different types of
independent variables that should affect this variable – measures of case facts, judicial
political preferences, and institutional constraints. To evaluate the normative effects of
Supreme Court precedent, we include a variable that captures the degree to which the
factual circumstances of the state supreme court decisions mirror conditions determined
as important in Supreme Court precedent writ large. Following Segal (1984), we first
measure the presence of seven different facts in search and seizure cases.6 For each of
these, the Supreme Court has previously established the validity of police searches in its
presence. Our variable is a count of how many of these are present in the progeny case.
The logic of this measure is straightforward – when a case before a state supreme court
strongly overlaps with existing Supreme Court precedent, the likelihood that the state
court upholds a search is higher. Including this measure allows us to better evaluate the
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political impact of cited precedent by controlling for both its normative effects and its
usefulness to state court decision-makers.
We measure the political preferences of judicial actors in a manner similar to
previous studies in the field. First, we do not explicitly measure the predilections of the
Supreme Court. Between 1983 and 1993, the mean ideology score on the Supreme Court
is always conservative, though it does shift slightly to the right in 1986 with Rehnquist
replacing Burger as chief justice, and the appointment of Scalia to the Court. Because it
is a relative constant throughout the course of our sample, it is not explicitly incorporated
into our analyses.7 We do include a measure of the precedent’s direction in order to
gauge its policy impact (see Hoekstra 2005). This measure is coded one if the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the government and zero otherwise. Assuming that state courts
mainly cite relevant precedent, then this variable should increase the likelihood of a
similar decision at the state level, ceteris paribus, if it has an impact on the lower court
(Hoekstra 2005). We measure the ideology of state supreme court justices using PAJID
scores (Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000). Specifically, the variable is the median PAJID
score for state supreme courts by year over the 1983 – 1995 period.8 This is an interval
measure with a range from zero (highly conservative) to one hundred (highly liberal).9
Finally, our design includes measures of the institutional constraints faced by state
supreme courts. Supreme Court monitoring is measured with two variables. The first is
the importance of the case to the Supreme Court, measured as the number of search and
seizure cases decided by the Supreme Court in the three years leading up to the state
supreme court decision (Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000). The second gauges conflict
between the Supreme Court and the state supreme court by coding the number of times
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that the Supreme Court has reversed that state supreme court on any issue in the previous
five years. State institutional constraints are measured with a trichotomous variable that
distinguishes states with retention elections, competitive elections, and appointive
systems. Information on state judicial retention systems comes from The Book of the
States (2003).
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are reported in Table 1. With
these data we are able to evaluate our hypotheses about lower court decision-making in
ways that have not yet been attempted. Unlike other studies, that focus on a relatively
small number of cases in a single issue area for a few courts (see Beavers and Walz 1998;
Beiser 1968; Cross and Tiller 1998; Dickson 1994; Gruhl 1981; Romans 1974; Smith and
Tiller 2002), we are able to evaluate how all state supreme courts address decisions of the
Supreme Court. In the following section, we discuss the results from these models.
[Table 1 about here]
Levels of Impact
Does the Supreme Court affect the direction of state supreme court decisions through
precedent? As a first cut at this question, we look at the simplest – but most
straightforward – piece of evidence. Table 2 shows the overall distribution of progeny by
the direction of both the cited precedent and the state supreme court decision. If state
supreme courts simply do what the Supreme Court suggests, we would expect all of the
observations to fall into the two impact categories. On the other hand, if state supreme
courts purposely (and unrealistically) do not follow the decisions of the Supreme Court,
then the cases would fall into the remaining categories.
[Table 2 about here]
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There is at least partial evidence here that state supreme courts make decisions
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Eighty percent of the progeny cited Supreme
Court precedent that favored government, essentially protecting the authority of the
police to gather evidence. This is not surprising considering the fact that the Court was
consistently conservative for the time period under examination, though it does suggest a
certain amount of cross-level judicial impact. Also consistent with legal depictions of
judicial hierarchy, 55% of all progeny decided on behalf of the same party as the
Supreme Court precedent it cited. This level of judicial consensus is a testimony to the
centrifugal pull of the decisions of the Supreme Court.
However, there is also substantial evidence that state supreme courts are making
decisions based on other factors. In 45% of the cases, the state-level decision favors a
different actor than the cited Supreme Court precedent, a non-negligible proportion of
cases. Among the four possible combinations, the second most frequent category (33%)
occurs when states restrict the government’s authority while citing a Supreme Court case
that does the opposite. The high frequency of this behavior probably reflects, in part,
liberal state courts distinguishing themselves from the conservative Supreme Court of
this era. However, it is also undoubtedly reflects the fact that the Supreme Court can set
a floor, but not a ceiling, on individual liberties. Buttressing this point is that in only 12%
of the cases does the state favor the government actor while citing a liberal Supreme
Court case.
Are these patterns related to variations in state context? Table 3 shows the
distribution of cases and outcomes in the fifty states. As this table makes clear, there is
substantial variation in the potential impact of Supreme Court precedent on state
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behavior, though the small sample sizes require us to view the point estimates with
skepticism. Some states, such as Delaware, Iowa, Maine, and Mississippi, cite precedent
that is pro-government and generally make the same decision. Other states, such as
California and Pennsylvania, consistently rule in favor of individuals while citing progovernment precedent. In still other states like Idaho and Virginia, progeny are more
evenly distributed in each of the four categories. The key point is that there is substantial
variation across the states in the relationship between precedent and state supreme court
decisions.
[Table 3 about here]
These data hold important insights into the working of our judicial system.
Importantly, there is evidence that the Supreme Court can effectively set a floor through
precedent, evidenced by the relatively infrequent appearance of pro-government
decisions citing pro-individual precedent. But legalistic explanations of the judicial
hierarchy do not seem capable of explaining state-by-state variations. If Supreme Court
precedent has strong normative value we should not observe strong and systematic levels
of variation across the states. Conversely, if the state courts are fundamentally free from
Supreme Court influences, we would expect a random distribution of cases in the four
categories across states. Instead, we see strong cross-state differences that are at least
superficially related to the political factors. For example, the patterns of impact in Table
3 are consistent with the idea of conflict between a conservative Supreme Court and at
least a handful of more liberal state courts that choose to extend individual liberties
further. Although these results are interesting, they do not explain – under what political
and institutional circumstances Supreme Court precedent influences state supreme court
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decisions.
Predicting the Outcomes of Progeny
The next step in our analysis is to model the outcomes of individual progeny as a
function of case characteristics, judicial political preferences, and institutional
constraints. Since our dependent variable is dichotomous (1 = decision in favor of state,
0 = decision in favor of individual), we use a logit model to estimate the impact of each
independent variable on the probability that the state supreme court rules in favor of the
government. To account for possible dependencies among cases decided in the same
state, we employ clustered standard errors by state. Given that our theoretical framework
predicts that state judicial institutions determine its responsiveness to policy influence of
Supreme Court precedent, we separate our data into different samples by judicial
retention method – Elite Retention, Competitive Election, and Retention (Merit) Election.
The results are reported in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here]
Looking the three sets of results, some interesting patterns emerge. In all three
systems, case facts have a statistically significant and positive effect. Simply stated, state
court decisions in cases that overlap significantly with fact patterns identified by the
Supreme Court as legitimate situations for warrantless searches are more likely to favor
the government. This result is entirely consistent with the normative view of the judicial
hierarchy – that justices are attentive to the facts of the case before them. Of note is that
the size of the case facts variables is twice as large in the Elite Selection model as it is in
the Competitive Election model; it is 50% larger than the coefficient in the Retention
Election model. Interestingly, the results also show that court ideology is only
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statistically significant in merit systems. In both the Elite Selection and Competitive
Election models, the coefficient is statistically insignificant.
More central to the questions identified in this paper are the coefficients
associated with the direction of cited Supreme Court precedent, the level of conflict
between the Supreme Court and state court, and the interaction of these two variables.
Because of the interaction term, the standard errors reported in the table do not provide us
with complete information on the significance of these three variables (Friedrich 1982).
Nevertheless, there are some interesting differences between the results in different
institutional settings. Most importantly, in elite selection systems, the baseline impact of
Supreme Court precedent is higher than it is in either of the electoral systems. What this
means is that, in the absence of any reversals there is a greater tendency toward impact in
the elite systems than in electoral systems.10 Conversely, in electoral systems the impact
of precedent is more clearly dependant upon the actions of the Supreme Court, a fact
reflected in the somewhat larger coefficients associated with frequency of reversal and
the interaction term.
While we reserve our full discussion of these results for the next section, the
statistical results provide the foundation for some interesting conclusions. Foremost
among them is that, no matter the institutional or political circumstances faced by state
justices, they respond to the broad normative constraints established by Supreme Court
precedent. This is consistent with arguments that 1) the Supreme Court sets a floor for
the states on civil liberties issues, and; 2) legal norms are important for establishing
coherency throughout the judiciary. Beyond this, we find that political factors still matter
a great deal, though the manner and extent to which they matter depends upon the local
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institutions for selecting and retaining justices. In particular, it appears that judges in
states with electoral systems are more responsive to the specific political predilections
ensconced in precedent when they have been susceptible to the higher courts intervention
in recent years.
Substantive Effects
To get a better understanding of how Supreme Court precedent impacts state
decisions in different settings, we show the impact of our variables on the probability that
the state court favors the government in its decision. Using the coefficient values from
Table 4 and holding all other variables at their means (not including interaction
coefficients), we first focus on the effects of frequency of reversal.11 In doing so, we
compute probabilities for courts that are relatively liberal, moderate, and conservative.12
Finally, we engage in this exercise for Supreme Court precedent that is both proindividual (labeled as “Liberal” in the graph) and pro-government (labeled as
“Conservative”) Supreme Court precedent.
Figure 1 shows the impact of frequency of reversal in elite systems. Two things stand
out in this graph. Foremost is that the impact of frequency of reversal is to always reduce
the probability that a state wins. Although this is not inconsistent with our theoretical
expectations, we can offer no clear explanation within our framework either. It would
seem that these courts see all conflict with the Supreme Court as encouraging them to pay
attention to the floor, but we cannot convincingly demonstrate the veracity of this claim.
Additionally, we see that judicial ideology has next-to-no impact on state judicial
decisions in these systems. Indeed, the lines for conservative, moderate, and liberal
courts are indistinguishable.
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[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 2 repeats this exercise for states that use competitive elections. Regardless of
the direction of the cited Supreme Court precedent, conservative state courts are always
more likely to rule in favor of the government and liberal courts in favor of individuals.
This confirms the importance of state judicial institutions for creating situations in which
judicial actors can consume their own ideological preferences, though the effect is not
very strong.
[Figure 2 about here]
What we see in these graphs is a striking difference based upon the direction of the
cited Supreme Court precedent. When it is conservative – that is, it establishes a ceiling
– state courts typically have at least a 70% probability of also making a conservative
decision. A similar picture emerges when state courts cite liberal Supreme Court
decisions – those that establish a floor. Keeping in mind that these state courts are
susceptible to close monitoring by state political actors, the states are less likely to win if
they have been reversed recently. Regardless of the ideology of the state supreme court
court’s ideology, the probability of a pro-government decision is around 70% If we
assume that governors and legislatures do not want high profile criminal cases to be
overturned, this seems like a reasonable result. However, as the Supreme Court becomes
more involved through overturning the states, it can effectively enforce its floor. For
states that have been overturned five or more times, the probability of a pro-government
decision drops below the 50% line for both liberal and conservative precedent.
Also of interest here is that, despite the fact that state court political preferences are
substantively important, the Supreme Court is still capable of encouraging lower courts to
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comply with its pro-individual decisions. There is more resistance in these systems to
conservative precedent, witnessed by the fact that state courts regardless of ideology do
not alter their behavior in the face of numerous reversals. This is entirely in keeping with
the idea that the federal constitution sets a floor for individual rights and that states are
free to afford greater protections. When justices in competitive election states cite liberal
Supreme Court precedent the probability of the state winning is over 80%, but as they are
increasingly reversed by the Supreme Court, the states probability of winning drops
quickly.
In Figure 3, we present the results of the impact of frequency of reversal on state
judicial behavior in merit retention systems. Here the substantive results are most
striking. In these states, when justices cite liberal decisions of the Supreme Court, the
state has a near 80% probability of winning, but by five reversals, that probability has
declined below 20%. When citing conservative precedent, regardless of state judicial
ideology, the justices are more likely to vote conservatively as the frequency of reversal
by the Supreme Court increases. These results are clear examples of the effect of judicial
ideology exerting a substantive impact on the outcome – we see justices instrumentally
responding to cited precedent on the bases of how frequently they conflict with the
Supreme Court. This is consistent with our arguments about risk aversion.
[Figure 3 about here]
Lastly, in Figure 4, we present evidence of the substantive importance of case facts on
state supreme court behavior. Traditional concepts of precedent suggest that as the case
facts in the extant case before a justice more closely resemble those in a previously
decided case, the influence of that precedent increases. Here we see clear evidence that
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the precedent is not treated similarly by justices across retention methods, further
confirming our earlier claims that the normative and political impact of precedent
depends upon the state judicial institutions.
[Figure 4 about here]
In elite retention systems, the power of precedent is evident. When citing liberal
decisions of the Supreme Court the probability that the state wins rises at approximately
the same rate as the number of case facts increases regardless of the rate of reversal,
suggesting that justices in those states are responding, not to the ‘sanction’ being meted
by the Supreme Court, but are, in fact, responding to the facts of the case.13 That changes
slightly for justices in competitive election states where recent reversal by the Supreme
Court does appear to exert an influence on the probability of the state winning. However,
the most striking findings arise when viewing the impact of case facts in merit retention
states. Here the effect of Supreme Court reversals on the state is substantial. Where the
state court has not been reversed the probability of the state winning is close to 50%,
increasing to over 90% by the time they reach six similar case facts. Conversely, where
the state has been reversed recently, the probability of the state winning is less than 20%,
but that increases to just over 50% of the time when six facts are present. This provides
substantial support for the conclusion that in merit retention states, justices are behaving
in a risk averse manner to achieve their policy goals within the constraints placed on
them by the Supreme Court.
Conclusion
The results presented here have important theoretical and substantive implications for
understanding the relationship between the Supreme Court and state supreme courts, but
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also for interpreting the importance of judicial retention methods and compliance with
precedent. Our results provide evidence that runs counter to the arguments forwarded by
policy makers interested in reforming state judicial retention methods. Justices in elite
retention systems respond to Supreme Court precedent most like how traditional legal
scholarship suggests that lower court judges should behave – precedent serves an
instructional purpose and state supreme court justices in those states evince a clear
pattern of following Supreme Court precedent regardless of ideology. In effect, despite
being chosen and retained by the legislature or governor of the state, these judges behave
most like we expect judges to behave.
State supreme court justices in competitive and merit retention states behave quite
differently, with (surprisingly) merit retention justices resisting Supreme Court precedent
and only grudgingly altering their decisions to conform to precedent when they are
reversed by the Supreme Court. This runs counter to arguments suggesting that merit
systems produce ‘better’ judges. If better means those less able (or willing) to vote their
policy preferences, regardless of existing Supreme Court precedent, then the results here
cast some doubt on that perspective. This research points out the complex relationship
between state supreme courts and the Supreme Court and illuminates the importance of
institutional arrangements in understanding the dissemination of precedent to the states.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. This table shows the mean, standard deviation, range,
and number of observations for the main variables in the progeny-level dataset.

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

N

Direction of
State Court
Decision

0.59

0.49

0

1

959

Direction of
Supreme
Court
Precedent

0.80

0.40

0

1

974

Mean PAJID
Score of
State Court

49.36

19.50

8.18

85.98

974

Frequency
of State
Supreme
Court
Reversal

1.99

2.01

0

9

973

Salience of
Search and
Seizure

18.14

8.29

2

32

972

Electoral
Method of
Retention

0.74

0.44

0

1

974

Case Facts

2.70

0.98

0

6

758

Variable
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Table 2. State Supreme Court Compliance with Supreme Court Precedent, 19831995. This table displays the proportion of decisions from state courts of last resort that
are decided consistent with the Supreme Court case they cite. The results show that for
the 1983-1995 time period, the two most frequent outcomes were pro-government
consistency and pro-individual inconsistency.

State Decision

U.S. Supreme Court Decision

Label

Percent

Favor Government

Favor Government

Pro-Government
Impact

47%
(452)

Favor Government

Favor Individual

Pro-Government
Non-impact

12%
(118)

Favor Individual

Favor Government

Pro-Individual Nonimpact

33%
(316)

Favor Individual

Favor Individual

Pro-Individual
Impact

Total

------

------

8%
(73)
100%
(959)
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Table 3. Impact in the States. This table shows the wide variation in treatment of
Supreme Court progeny across the states.

State Name
Alaska
Alabama
Arkansas
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Iowa
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Maryland
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Mississippi
Montana
North Carolina
North Dakota
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
Nevada
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin
West Virginia
Wyoming
Total

Pro-State
Impact
0%
64%
63%
67%
33%
32%
47%
67%
43%
40%
0%
81%
40%
50%
37%
65%
67%
50%
51%
46%
69%
46%
40%
53%
65%
65%
57%
45%
46%
32%
40%
14%
80%
35%
57%
41%
60%
23%
47%
50%
44%
14%
38%
40%
50%
60%
44%
70%
28%
53%
47%

Pro-Individual
Impact
0%
0%
0%
8%
12%
16%
11%
4%
9%
0%
11%
6%
5%
9%
10%
6%
0%
6%
3%
8%
6%
8%
10%
10%
8%
0%
0%
9%
6%
5%
13%
0%
20%
15%
0%
18%
0%
4%
12%
17%
0%
0%
10%
13%
20%
0%
11%
0%
11%
0%
8%

Pro-State
Non-impact
0%
9%
8%
8%
12%
10%
19%
8%
5%
10%
11%
0%
30%
9%
21%
6%
0%
13%
14%
0%
13%
8%
33%
5%
4%
5%
0%
0%
26%
26%
13%
43%
0%
8%
14%
18%
13%
4%
12%
0%
33%
14%
8%
7%
20%
13%
22%
17%
6%
18%
12%

Pro-Individual
Non-impact
100%
27%
29%
17%
42%
42%
23%
21%
43%
50%
78%
13%
25%
32%
32%
23%
33%
31%
32%
46%
13%
38%
17%
32%
23%
30%
43%
45%
23%
37%
33%
43%
0%
42%
29%
23%
27%
69%
29%
33%
22%
71%
44%
40%
10%
27%
22%
13%
56%
29%
33%

Number of
Progeny
1
11
24
12
33
50
47
24
21
10
9
16
20
22
19
17
6
16
37
24
16
13
30
19
26
20
21
22
35
19
15
7
5
26
14
17
15
26
17
6
9
7
39
15
10
15
18
23
18
17
959
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Table 4. Models of State Judicial Decision-Making Across Institutional Contexts.
These logit coefficients show the effect of political and legal variables on state judicial
decisions across the three types of selection systems used in American states.
Independent Variables

Elite Selection
β

Competitive Election

Std. error

β

0.62

0.17***

Median State Court PAJID

0.00

0.01

-0.01

Supreme Court Decision Direction

0.14

0.33

-1.20

Salience

0.04

0.03

0.01

Frequency of Reversal

-0.23

Reversal * SCDD

0.04

Constant

-1.54

***p<.01, two-tailed test

β

Std. error

0.40

0.18**

0.01

-0.02

0.01**

0.41***

-0.91

0.61

0.02

0.02

0.15**

0.28

Search & Seizure Case Facts

N
Pseudo-R2
Likelihood χ2
Log Likelihood

Std. error

Merit Retention
Election

0.01

-0.31

0.09***

-0.61

0.25**

0.09

0.30

0.10***

0.72

0.25***

0.65**

0.90

0.50*

0.35

0.81

0.06***

186
0.10
89.24***
-111.47

389
0.04
22.74**
-252.82

**p<.05, two-tailed test

179
0.06
140.39***
115.30

*p<.10, two-tailed test
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Figure 1. Impact of Frequency of Reversal, State Court Ideology, and the Direction
of Supreme Court Precedent in Elite Selection Systems.
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Figure 2. Impact of Frequency of Reversal, State Court Ideology, and the Direction
of Supreme Court Precedent in Competitive Electoral Systems.
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Figure 3. Impact of Frequency of Reversal, State Court Ideology, and the Direction
of Supreme Court Precedent in Retention Systems.
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Figure 4. Impact of Case Facts, Frequency of Reversal, and State Judicial
Institutions for Liberal Supreme Court Precedent.
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Appendix A
Sampling State Supreme Court Progeny
Sampling Procedure. The unit of analysis in our dataset is state supreme court
progeny. To gather these data, we developed a three step process for identifying a
representative sample of state supreme court progeny. First, we compiled a list of all
orally-argued search and seizure cases that were decided upon the by Supreme Court
from 1983-1993. We developed this list using the issue area codes and United States
Identification Numbers in the United States Supreme Court Database. The temporal
restriction is somewhat arbitrary, but was necessary in order to make our data collection
effort manageable. This produced a list of sixty three different Supreme Court cases.
The second step was to Shepardize these Supreme Court cases.14 This generated a list
that contained 4859 state supreme court decisions extending from 1983 to April 2002.
Because the ideology scores for state justices only extends to 1995 (Brace, Langer, and
Hall 2000), we dropped all state progeny decided after 1995. Eliminating these cases left
us with a sampling frame of state citations with 3339 observations. Each Supreme Court
case yielded an average of 53 progeny, though there was a fair amount of diversity in the
distribution (s2 = 84.6) and the distribution is fairly skewed (median = 30).
The third step was to draw a random number to each of these progeny. We did this
by assigning each observation a unique number from a uniform distribution that ranged
from zero to one, with mean equal to .5. We then ordered the cases according to their
randomly assigned number and drew the first sixteen percent for our sample.15 This
yielded a sample of 1020 cases. For each of these progeny, we collected data on the
independent and dependent variables described in the paper. After accounting for a
15

Note that this is a “sampling without replacement” procedure.
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previously unidentified error in the sampling frame (a Supreme Court case decided prior
to 1983 slipped into our frame) and missing data, we were left with an effective sample
of approximately 974 observations.
Progeny Sample Quality. To assess the quality of our sample, we engaged in some
post-hoc examination of the data. First, if our procedure produced an accurate
representation of search and seizure progeny, we expected to find that the state supreme
court cases would typically involve cases in which one actors was a governmental actor
and the other was an individual. This was true in all but eight of the progeny (1.6-percent
of the effective sample). In these eight cases, the disputes were between two different
individuals and typically involved a property dispute of some type.
If the sampling procedure was successful at producing a random sample, we also
expected that the percentage of cases by state would be roughly equal in both the
sampling frame and the eventual sample (i.e., not the effective sample). Figure A1 shows
that the number of cases per state varies considerably, as would be expected given the
substantial differences in state judicial culture and behavior. But we are more interested
in whether these numbers correspond in a sensible manner to the proportion of cases by
state in the sampling frame.
[Figure A1 about here]
We examined this by aggregating the number of cases in both the sampling frame and
sample to the state level. We then computed a regression in which the percentage of state
cases in the sampling frame was used to predict the number of cases in the sample. If the
sampling procedure was accurate, we would expect the regression line to have an
intercept of zero and a slope of .16, because we randomly drew sixteen percent of the
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frame for our sample. Figure A2 shows a scatterplot of the number of cases in the
sampling frame on the number of cases in the sample, with an actual regression estimate
and a line representing a perfectly representative and random sample. According to this
graph, our sampling procedure slightly underrepresented states that had the most number
of cases in the sampling frame because the actual regression line is shallower than the
random sample line. At the same time, the slope estimate (β* = .14) is remarkably
similar to the random sample slope (β=.16). And, while there may be some slight
heteroskedasticity in the real regression estimate, the actual observations are clustered
quite closely around the line. This suggests that the number of cases per state in the
sampling frame is quite similar to the number in the sample, suggesting a high degree of
representativeness across states.
[Figure A2 about here]
As a final check on the quality of our sample, we wanted to ascertain whether we
might have to account for a sample selection bias in the dependent variable. In other
words, we decided it was important to determine whether or not there was correlation
between the dependent variable and the cases in the sample. Since we only have
information on the dependent variable for our sample, we can only determine whether
this correlation exists for the sample data. If there was no sample selection problem, we
expected that there would be no relationship between the number of cases in a sample
and the percentage of cases within each state that complied with Supreme Court
precedent (we collapsed the two types of noncompliance). Figure A3 shows a scatterplot
of the number of cases in the sample and the percent of noncompliance in each state. As
this display clearly demonstrates, there is a negligible relationship between these two
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variables. This implies that the sample is not biased by having cases from states that
exhibit abnormally high or low patterns of noncompliance.
[Figure A3 about here]
Based on these analyses, we concluded that we did not draw an odd sample and that,
in fact, the sample was a reasonable representation of the universe of cases in our
sampling frame.
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Figure A1. Progeny Per State. This depicts the number of state supreme court progeny
in each state in the sample. It demonstrates a high level of variation between the states.
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Figure A2. Number of Cases Per State in the Sample versus the Sampling Frame.
This graph plots the number of state supreme court progeny in each state that were in the
sampling frame against the number of progeny per state in the sample. The dotted line
shows the predicted regression equation for a successful random sample, with intercept
equal to zero and slope equal to .16. The solid line runs more shallow than that, showing
that our sample slightly over-represents those states that cite Supreme Court precedent
less frequently.
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Figure A3. Number of Cases Per State in the Sample and State Supreme Court
Consistency. This graph plots the number of state supreme court progeny in each state
that were in the sample as a function of state disagreement with the cited Supreme Court.
This graph shows that the sample cases are not dependent on the extent to which state
higher court decisions are consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Appendix B. Impact of Case Facts, Frequency of Reversal, and State Judicial
Institutions for Conservative Supreme Court Precedent.
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Endnotes
1

463 US 1032, 1983.

2

We can borrow an analogy from the bureaucracy literature to help make this point. In elite systems,

monitoring is closer to “police patrols” where the elites monitor the courts with some regularity. By
contrast, electoral systems are more of a “fire alarm” system where the monitors – in this case the public –
pay closer attention when problems arise.
3

These data were collected from “The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-2005

Terms” compiled by Harold Spaeth (2007).
4

See Appendix A for full details.

5

We consider the citation string the number of cases that are cited by the progeny as a group. Opinions

will often discuss particular legal issues and conclude the paragraph with reference to a number of cases.
We consider that if the state supreme court were to include the Supreme Court precedent in question in a
citation string to be an effort to “hide” the cite from scrutiny in a potential effort to skirt that holding while
at the same time attempting to raise any red flags that might lead to review and a reversal.
6

The seven case facts are whether 1.) the search occurred in a home, 2.) the search occurred in a business,

3.) the search occurred in a car, 4.) the search occurred on a person, 5.) it was a full search, 6.) the search
occurred after a warrant at been issued, and 7.) the trial court had determined the presence of probable
cause. Although Segal (1984) enters these into his model separately, we find no differences in our key
findings if we enter them as an index.
7

As noted, there is a shift to the right in the political preferences of the Supreme Court. The analyses we

present below do not change when accounting for this shift.
8

The PAJID scores are measures of individual justices’ political preferences. Our hypotheses, however,

are about where the state courts stand in general since opinions are arrived at by all justices on the state
courts. The traditional approach to dealing with this problem, which we employ here, is to use the median
justice’s score as a measure of the “swing point” on the court.
9

We are grateful to Laura Langer for generously sharing these data.
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10

This might be more accurately stated as there is a tendency in the electoral systems toward distinguishing

themselves from cited Supreme Court precedent in these systems when they haven’t been reversed
frequently.
11

In determining the impact of frequency of reversal, we controlled both the number of reversals and the

value of interaction coefficient so that they both reflect their real values. For example, when the cited
precedent is liberal, the interaction variable is zero. When it is conservative, it is equal to the value of the
frequency of reversal.
12

For purposes of these simulations, we define these as the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the PAJID

variable.
13

We have also calculated the substantive effect of case facts in cases citing conservative Supreme Court

precedent and the results are quite similar. These results are contained in Appendix B.
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